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substantive chapter, and the appendices contain much repetitive material, as does the concluding chapter. But readers
must be wary of skimming passages that are mostly redundant
because new material that may help clarify the difficult abstractions is sometimes interjected. The redundancies reduce
the power of the book's message.
Third, the book is overlarded with jargon (not just
principal-agent jargon) and with abstractions. For example,
the author is enamored with "endogenous" and "exogenous,"
which have a technical (and counterintuitive) meaning in
terms of the statistical model, and the overuse of which may
leave the reader confused. Furthermore, the style of presentation is altogether too abstract. For example, "policy innovations," or "shocks,"or "perturbations"play an important role
in the analysis. But determining exactly what is meant by the
terms requires concentrated effort, and virtually all of the explanations are provided in abstract form-most clearly in the
course of elaborating upon a complex equation on page 32.
In the substantive chapter, we learn that the bureaucracies'
reactions to "shocks" show "sophisticated" and "strategic"
behavior, which means that they exercise considerable degrees of autonomy from the president and Congress. But the
lengthy discussion provides no illustration of this "sophisticated" behavior that would move us out of the realm of
abstraction.
Krause has made a significant contribution to our understanding of presidential-congressional-bureaucratic relationships. His major contribution is that he pounds another
nail-perhaps the final one-in the coffin of principal-agent
theorizing and brings us back to traditional political analysis, which understands that these relationships are highly
complex and variable from one bureaucracy to another and
from one policy area to another. Furthermore, he demonstrates that however important one of the political branches
might be at a given time, American bureaucracies retain sufficient power resources so as to exercise significant degrees of
political autonomy-but that political outcomes always are
contingent.
Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative
Study. By Laura Langer. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2002. 192p. $62.50 cloth, $20.95 paper.
Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina
in
Interest strategic approaches to an understanding of judicial decision making, including the implications of the separation of powers (SOP), has grown dramatically in recent years.
Unfortunately, almost all the research on these SOP interactions has been limited to those involving the U.S. Supreme
Court. Laura Langer's book provides a refreshing alternative to the exclusive Supreme Court focus by examining the
significance of separation of powers concerns for the exercise
of judicial review by state supreme courts.
Langer starts by making a convincing case for the importance of studying judicial review in state supreme courts. She
demonstrates that these courts are important policymakers,
tackling a number of important issue areas for which no review by the U.S. Supreme Court is possible.
The basic thesis of this book is that judicial review in state
supreme courts is shaped by the pursuit of political ambitions,
the institutional rules and arrangements governing courts in
the states, the nature of the policy adjudicated by the court,
and the political context in which the courts operate. Strategic
models of judicial behavior are developed to explain both
agenda decisions of the courts and the decision on the merits
stage. Under a strictly attitudinal model, judges would vote
their personal ideological preferences without regard to the
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contextual and institutional features of state politics. In contrast, Langer argues that judges will be reluctant to overturn
state laws in salient policy areas when other state elites hold
divergent views unless there are institutional features that
tend to shield the judges from the sanctions of other elites.
To test these strategic models, Langer examines all constitutional challenges to state action in four issue areas decided
by state supreme courts for the period 1970-93. She hypothesizes that the extent to which judges behave strategically will
be directly related to the saliency of the issue under consideration.
In the most ideologically salient area, campaign and election laws, the results largely fit the predictions of the strategic
models. Most notably, courts are less likely to docket constitutional challenges to legislative decisions when the ideological
distance between the court and other elected elites is large.
However, the presence of institutional features that might
protect courts, including a difficult constitutional amendment
process and a judicial retention process in which judges do
not need the direct support of either the governor or the
legislature, increases the chances that a constitutional challenge will be docketed. In the decisions on the merits, the
evidence is mixed. As predicted by the attitudinal model, the
personal preferences of the judges are strongly related to their
votes, while the ideological distance between the court and
other elites does not have the effect predicted by strategic
models. However, several institutional features that might
protect judges from retaliation by other elites do increase the
chance that a challenged law will be overturned.
For the least salient policy area, welfare laws, agendasetting decisions are much more consistent with an attitudinal explanation. Most notably, as the ideological distance
between the court and other elites increases, the probability
that the court will hear a constitutional challenge increases.
However, at the merits stage the results are inconclusive.
Overall, this book makes a significant contribution to our
understanding of the role of courts in the American political
system. The focus of most of the previous literature on the
U.S. Supreme Court has made it impossible to adequately understand the role of institutional features and, consequently,
has made it impossible to adequately test strategic models of
judicial decision making. In general, the design of this study is
more sophisticated than the design of most "tests" of either
the attitudinal or strategic models of U.S. Supreme Court
decision making, and as a result, its findings may suggest
new insights for understanding Supreme Court behavior in
a broader perspective. For example, the findings that state
supreme courts under certain conditions will engage in strategic, rather than strictly attitudinal, voting raises questions
about the widely assumed (e.g., see Segal and Spaeth, The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 1993) but untested
theory that the factors necessary for attitudinal voting on
the U.S. Supreme Court include docket control and its status
as a court whose decisions are not subject to further judicial review. In contrast, the widespread finding of extensive
attitudinal voting on the U.S. Supreme Court would be predicted from the findings of Langer's study that a number of
institutional features possessed by the Court all decrease the
probability of strategic voting. Among those features are the
presence of an intermediate appellate court, long judicial
terms, the difficulty of the executive or legislative branches to
affect the retention of the judges, and the difficulty of constitutional amendment. This study further enhances our understanding of the effects of separation of powers by demonstrating that the effects that vary substantially across issue areas
depend on the saliency of the issue. It is unfortunate that the
importance of issue saliency is absent from most studies of
separation of powers effects on the U.S. Supreme Court.

American Political Science Review
The careful design, extensive data collection, and rigorous
analysis make Langer's study an important contribution to
the understanding of strategic decision making by appellate
courts. Nevertheless, some of the choices on analytical design
and operationalization of variables tend to reduce the impact
of what remains a fine study in spite of these limitations. Most
disappointing, the manner in which the "legal" variables are
operationalized makes it difficult to draw any significant conclusions on the relative impact of the legal model versus the
impacts of strategic versus pure attitudinal models. The key
legal variables are whether or not the court's opinion relies
on independent state grounds and on the level of scrutiny employed (see p. 52). Unfortunately, neither of these variables
is independent of the decision, and thus it is inappropriate to
use them to "explain" those decisions.
Less troublesome, the methods sections need to more
clearly define some of the variables. In particular, many readers will not be familiar with the measure of judge ideology
adopted (see p. 44) and may need further assurances that the
ideology of judges and the ideology of other state elites are
really measured according to a common metric that makes
it reasonable to compute distance scores between the two
measures.
Finally,while the direct effects of the independent variables
in the models are interesting and theoretically important, it
would have been useful to explore the interactions between
judge ideology and/or ideological distance and some of the
institutional variables.
The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational
Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang
Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p.
$55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University
James March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou address
the fascinating question of how rules evolve in a complex
organization with a unique data set. Stanford University was
founded in the decades before the turn of the last century. The
authors searched and coded a vast Stanford archive of materials on rules related to student contact, the student honor
system, faculty appointment and tenure procedures, faculty
governance, and finally rules related to accounting, purchasing, and other administrative functions of a university. They
are able to examine questions concerning the external and
internal stimulants to rule creation, change, and suspension.
No other book equals this one in regard to the breadth of the
questions asked and the mode of analysis.
The basic approach of March and his colleagues is to examine how rules evolve over time in response to internal or
external problems. They see rules as recording history and
accumulating the learning that individuals in an organization
acquire, including the ways to cope with repetitive problems.
Because they see rules as a written residue of past efforts
to regularize responses to internal and external problems,
they argue that one has to do historical analysis in order to
understand the problems that generated the creation or modification of the rules at an earlier period. Thus, they explore
a wide diversity of external or internal factors occurring over
time that are posited to affect rule origin or change. Some
rules may be very useful in solving a particular problem in
a specific era but become an unused residue at a later time.
In other words, all organizations may have rules-in-form that
are rarely used, due to the fact that the problem-set they
help to solve has changed over time and no one has had
their attention called to the fact that a rule is no longer
necessary.
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Further, the authors address important questions related
to organizational structure and change. They develop competing hypotheses that are analyzed with the fantastic data
set they have developed. One set of competing hypotheses
relates to the effects of changes in one rule on changes in
other rules. Given assumptions about bounded rationality,
a core question has to do with how members of a complex
organization pay attention to the possibility of changing rules.
The four hypotheses they develop are 1) The Contagion Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule generate attention to other
rules, thus increase changes elsewhere"; 2) The Competition
Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule distract attention from
other rules, thus decrease changes elsewhere"; 3) The Multiplier Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule necessitate changes
in others, thus increase changes elsewhere"; and 4) The Substitution Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule substitute for
changes in others, thus decrease changes elsewhere" (p. 70).
In addition to these four hypotheses, they address a host
of others that focus on when rules are adopted, how fast they
are modified, and when they are dropped. They ask whether
internal sources of problems related to conflict of interest
or to technical coordination are most responsible for rule
changes. They also examine environmental factors, including
the proportion of the university's budget stemming from federal government sources. They use sophisticated multivariant
statistics to examine their long series of event histories.
Among the surprising findings of this study is that increases
in federal government funding are associated with negative
rates of rule revision rather than positive rates, as most organization theorists would expect (p. 187). They also find that rule
change is faster in meeting diverse pressure from the technical
environment (involving accounting and purchasing) than it is
in meeting the political pressures that exist on all university
campuses (p. 190). Their findings also challenge some of the
conventional views that changes in rules are stimulated primarily by the effort to manage complexity. They find "very
few size and program effects in any of our models of rule birth
and rule change" (p. 170).
Scholars interested in the study of institutional arrangements will find this a valuable part of their library. The
methodology is one that needs to be applied to a diversity
of organizations. Following an organization from its very
founding is an excellent way of studying the growth of rules
as a function, both of the internal coordination problems of
a growing organization and the external problems that any
university has faced, especially during the twentieth century.
The concept of rules as "carriers of knowledge" turns out to
be a powerful way of approaching the study of rules.
Institutional theorists with both a rational choice and a
sociological approach to organizations will find valuable aspects in this book. Chapter 1 presents a healthy skepticism
about the optimality of rules and the presumption made by
some that changes in rules usually result in improvements in
outcomes rather than the reverse.
Not surprisingly, March and colleagues adopt a strong assumption that individuals use a logic of appropriateness. They
assume that individuals "act to fulfill identities, defining what
is implied by a particular identity or what is expected, socially
or morally, in a particular situation" (p. 6). The identities of
individuals, however, are somewhat too strongly presumed
to stem from rules. After the recent Enron scandal, one has
a hard time accepting the following: "Rules define organizational identities and boundaries and stabilize linkages with
other organizations. Accountants do what proper accountants do. Managers do what proper managers do. Each follows
rules that define appropriate behavior for the role he or she
plays" (p. 9). If only that were to have characterized the behavior of the accountants and managers of Enron and other
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